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Abstract
We discuss Boltzmann’s explanation of the irreversible thermodynamic evolution of
macroscopic systems on the basis of time-symmetric microscopic laws, providing a
comprehensive presentation of what we call the typicality account. We then discuss
the connection between this general scheme and the H-theorem, demonstrating the
conceptual continuity between them. In our analysis, a special focus lies on the
crucial role of typicality. Putting things in wider perspective, we go on to analyze
the philosophical dimensions of this concept, explaining the connection between
typicality and probability, and demonstrate its relevance for scientific reasoning,
in particular for understanding the supervenience of macroscopic laws on micro-
scopic laws. The second part of the paper responds to recent objections against
the typicality account that have been raised in the philosophical literature. In par-
ticular, the concept of ergodicity, or a variant thereof, named “epsilon-ergodicity”,
which has been promoted by some authors as a crucial additional assumption on
the dynamics, is shown to be of no use for its intended purpose.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, a series of papers by various highly distinguished
mathematical physicists stressed the importance of the concept of typical-
ity as a basis for probabilistic reasoning in physics, in particular as a basis
for the explanation of the second law of thermodynamics by statistical me-
chanics (Goldstein 2001,Lebowitz 1993,Bricmont 1995,Penrose 1999). None
of these authors took much credit for the presented ideas, each of them
rather stressed that he was presenting or recapturing the groundbreaking
insights of Ludwig Boltzmann who had shown how to explain and (in some
sense) derive macroscopic regularities on the basis of the underlying laws for
the microscopic constituents of matter. Nevertheless, reintroducing these
ideas to Physicists, Mathematicians and Philosophers proved to be neces-
sary, as their relevance is rarely appreciated today and the response to the
papers of Lebowitz, Goldstein and others shows that they are still subject
to widespread misconceptions and misunderstandings.
The present paper originated as a response to various publications by
Roman Frigg and Charlotte Werndl (Frigg 2009 and 2011, Frigg and Werndl
2011 and 2012) who established themselves as two of the most outspoken
critics of this approach to the foundations of statistical mechanics, though
in the end, it grew into a more comprehensive discussion of statistical me-
chanics, the “second law” and the concept of typicality. In section 2, we will
recall the basics of Boltzmann’s statical mechanics and its explanation of
the second law of thermodynamics. Section 3 will elaborate on the details
of this explanation, in particular with respect to the role of typicality and
the issue of irreversibility, providing a comprehensive presentation of what
we call the typicality account. In section 4, we will discuss the Boltzmann
equation and the H-theorem and clarify their relationship to the typicality
account, demonstrating the conceptual unity between these two cornerstones
of Boltzmann’s work in statistical mechanics that are often, falsely, viewed
as alternatives. Section 5 is the most philosophical part of the paper, dis-
cussing the meaning of typicality and its relevance to scientific reasoning, in
particular in the context of understanding the precise way in which macro-
scopic laws can be reduced to microscopic laws. In these first sections, we
thus hope to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date account of Boltzman-
nian statistical mechanics and the central concepts involved. In the last two
sections, we will then explicitly address some questions and alleged prob-
lems that came up in the philosophical literature (but which, ideally, at that
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point of our treatment, will not have remained open in the first place). In
section 6, we comment on the role of the dynamics in the typicality account,
responding, in particular, to criticisms of Jos Uffink, Roman Frigg and Char-
lotte Werndl, that we found to be thoroughly misguided. In section 7, we
will explain why the concept of ergodicity, which is often regarded as crucial
to the foundations of statistical mechanics, and, even more so, the concept
of epsilon-ergodicity promoted by Frigg and Werndl are irrelevant to the
explanation of thermodynamic behavior.
2 Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics
The discussion to which we want to contribute is concerned with the expla-
nation of the irreversible thermodynamic behavior of macroscopic systems.
The term “thermodynamic behavior” refers to the ubiquitous phenomenon
that physical systems, prepared or created in a non-equilibrium state and
then suitably isolated from the environment, tend to evolve to and then stay
in a distinguished macroscopic configuration called the equilibrium state. Fa-
miliar examples are the spreading of a gas, the mixing of milk and coffee,
the disappearance of temperature gradients, and so on.
Historically, this empirical regularity was captured by the second law of
thermodynamics, positing the monotonous increase of a macroscopic variable
of state called entropy, which attains its maximum value in equilibrium. The
main task of statistical mechanics is to explain this macroscopic regularity
on the basis of the underlying laws guiding the behavior of the system’s
micro-constituents.
A crucial ingredient to the understanding of this issue is the distinction
between macro- and microstate of a system. Whereas the microstate X(t) of
a system is given by the complete specification of all its microscopic degrees
of freedom (e.g. position and momenta of all the particles constituting the
system), its macrostate M(t) is specified in terms of physical variables that
characterize the system on macroscopic scales (like the volume it occupies,
the pressure of a gas or fluid, the distribution of blue ink in water, and
so on). The macroscopic state of a system is completely determined by
its microscopic configuration, that is M(t) = M(X(t)), but one and the
same macrostate can generally be realized by a large number of different
microstates all of which “look macroscopically the same”. The partitioning of
the set of microstates into different macrostates is therefore called a “coarse-
graining”. Turning to the phase-space picture of Hamiltonian mechanics for
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an N -particle system, a microstate corresponds to one point X = (q, p) in
phase-space Ω ∼= R3N × R3N , q being the position- and p the momentum-
coordinates of the N particles, whereas a macrostate M corresponds to an
entire region ΓM ⊆ Ω of phase-space, namely the set of all microstates
that realize M . The microscopic laws of motion are such that any initial
microstate X0 determines the complete microevolution X(t) = φt(X0) of
the system, represented by a unique trajectory in phase-space going through
X0, thereby also determining its complete macro-evolution M(X(t)) as the
microstate passes through different macro-regions.
These concepts are pretty much forced on us if we accept the superve-
nience of macroscopic facts on microscopic facts and they are essential to
understanding the nature of the problem. The second law of thermody-
namics describes an empirical regularity about the macro-evolution M(t) of
physical systems. However, since this macro-evolution supervenes on the
evolution of the microscopic configuration, and since the evolution of the
microscopic configuration is determined by precise and unambiguous laws
of motion, there is no place for macroscopic laws over and above the mi-
croscopic laws, and the empirical regularities expressed in the former must
be explained or justified on the basis of the latter. This seems like quite
a formidable task, though, as it requires us to reconcile the irreversibility
of thermodynamic behavior with the time-reversal symmetry of the micro-
scopic laws of motion. This symmetry implies that for every solution of the
microscopic equations of motion realizing a certain sequence of macrostates,
there exists another solution passing through the same set of macrostates
in opposite order. And yet, we never observe the spontaneous assembly
of a gas in one corner of a box, or the spontaneous unmixing of milk and
coffee, or heat flowing from a colder body to a hotter one. However, the
formidable task of reconciling this macroscopic irreversibility with reversible
microscopic laws was indeed accomplished by Ludwig Boltzmann at the end
of the 19th century. Lebowitz, Penrose, Goldstein and Bricmont reminded
us how. In doing so, each of them stressed two main insights of the great
Austrian physicist:
1. The identification of the (Clausius) entropy with the (logarithm of) the
phase-space volume corresponding to its current macrostate. Formally:
S = kB ln |ΓM(X)|, (1)
where kB is the Boltzmann constant and |ΓM | denotes the volume
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(the Lebesgue- or Liouville-measure) of the phase-space region ΓM .
The Boltzmann entropy is thus de facto a logarithmic measure of the
phase-space volume corresponding to the system’s macrostate.
2. The understanding that the equilibrium macro-region occupies almost
the entire phase-space volume, i.e., that almost every microstate is an
equilibrium state.
Note that the logarithm in the definition of the Boltzmann entropy1 has the
effect that significant differences in entropy correspond to huge differences in
the phase-space volume corresponding to the respective macrostates. And
indeed, we will generally find that for macroscopic systems, i.e. for systems
with a very large number of microscopic degrees of freedom, the partitioning
of microstates into macrostates does not correspond to a partitioning of
phase-space into regions of roughly the same size, but into regions whose
sizes vary by many orders of magnitude, with the region of maximum entropy
– by definition the equilibrium region – being by far the largest.2 This is
also known as Boltzmann’s combinatorial argument.
The two insights stressed above are the key ingredients in Boltzmann’s
account of the second law of thermodynamics. What we learn from them
is that the thermodynamic behavior that we want to explain is in fact not
a feature of certain special micro-evolutions, but rather the kind of macro-
evolution that would correspond to almost any generic trajectory through
phase-space. Since phase-space consists almost entirely of equilibrium states,
the evolution of a system’s microstate, starting out in a low-entropy region,
would have to be extremely peculiar to avoid carrying the system into re-
gions of higher entropy and finally into an equilibrium state, while the evo-
lution of a system starting out in equilibrium would have to be extremely
peculiar to carry the microscopic configuration into the vanishingly small
non-equilibrium region any time soon. Penrose summarizes the argument as
follows:
1which is necessary to identify S with the thermodynamic Clausius entropy that is an
extensive variable of state, i.e. the total entropy of two combined independent systems is
supposed to be the sum of the entropies of the individual systems.
2Many authors choose to define equilibrium as a stationary macrostate of a system.
The problem with this definition is that, in the end, one is talking about the empty set,
since it turns out that the macrostates that one used to refer to as equilibrium-states are
not exactly stationary, though they are states of maximum (Boltzmann-)entropy and as
a consequence thereof (as we will see) for all practical purposes stationary.
6
We would seem now to have an explanation for the second law!
For we may suppose that our phase-space point does not move
about in any particularly contrived way, and if it starts off in a
tiny phase-space volume, corresponding to a small entropy, then,
as time progresses, it will indeed be overwhelmingly likely to move
into successively larger and larger phase-space volumes, corre-
sponding to gradually increasing entropy values. (Penrose 1999, p.
408)
The same reasoning, in a different wording, is also found in the other publi-
cations cited above. The authors, as one would expect from scientists of their
stature, say no more or less than necessary and if the reader feels like the
issue is thus already settled, we would readily agree. Yet we notice that their
presentations, aiming for simplicity and generality, spared some of the de-
tails and intricacies of the argument and it seems that they have thus left too
much room for objections and misconceptions, some understandable, some
irritating, all ultimately unnecessary. Lebowitz rightly warned us, quoting
Ruelle, that the ideas of Boltzmann are “at the same time simple and rather
subtle” (Lebowitz 1993, p. 7). The aim of our paper is to spell out these
subtleties, which often remain unspoken, thus addressing the most common
objections and clarifying the role of typicality in the argument.
3 Typicality and irreversibility
3.1 The combinatorial argument
Let’s now discuss the details of the “typicality account” sketched above for
the concrete example of a gas in a box. This example will accompany us
as the paradigmatic case for thermodynamic behavior throughout the entire
paper. We thus consider a system of about N = 1023 particles, interacting
by a repelling, short-range potential – or, in the case of an ideal gas, not
interacting at all – which are confined to a finite volume within a box with
reflecting walls. Now assume that we find, or prepare, the system in the
macrostate M2 sketched below, that is, we consider a configuration of the
particles that looks, macroscopically, like a gas filling out half the volume of
the box. What kind of evolution, on the macroscopic scale, should we expect
for the gas?
Well, as Boltzmann argued, a simple combinatorial argument shows that
the overwhelming majority of microstates that the system could possibly
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Figure 1: Thermodynamic evolution of a gas
evolve in will look, macroscopically, like Meq, i.e. like a gas that is homo-
geneously distributed over the entire volume of the box. In fact, one can
readily conclude that phase-space volume corresponding to this equilibrium
marostate Meq is about 2N ≈ 101023 times larger than the phase-space vol-
ume occupied by configurations with substantially lower entropy!3 Hence,
as the particles move with different speeds in different directions, scattering
from each other and occasionally from the walls, the system’s microstate
wanders around on an erratic (though, of course, deterministic) path in the
high-dimensional phase-space that should soon end up in the equilibrium
region. In other words, we should expect, by all reasonable means, that the
evolution of the microscopic configuration will be one that carries the system
from M2 to Meq. However, it is clear (and it was clear to Boltzmann) that
there will be microscopic configurations belonging to the macrostate M2,
configurations, that is, which look like a gas filling the left half of the box,
that will not show this expected macroevolution, but evolve into a state of
lower entropy. This is a consequence of the time-reversal invariance of the
microscopic laws. For if we consider a macrostate of even lower entropy,
M1, we have to conclude that for every solution of the microscopic laws of
motion corresponding to the macro-evolution from M1 to M2 (which is the
evolution that we would now predict by an analogous reasoning), there exists
a solution carrying an initial microstate in ΓM2 into the macro-region ΓM1 –
we just have to take the microstate in ΓM2 that has evolved from ΓM1 and
reverse the momentum of every particle! This was the content of Loschmidt’s
3Comparing, for instance, the possible equilibrium configurations with all possible con-
figurations that coarse-grain to the macrostate M2, we see that every single particle has
roughly twice the volume that it could be in.
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reversibility objection. However, as Boltzmann understood, the microstates
(the initial conditions in ΓM2) that lead to this anti-thermodynamic behavior
are extremely special ones relative to all possible microstates realizing M2.
The correct statement is thus that almost all initial microstates in ΓM2 will
evolve into the equilibrium region Γeq, while only a very small set of “bad”
initial conditions will show the anti-thermodynamic evolution from ΓM2 into
ΓM1 .
It is helpful in this context to consider the set of all solutions with initial
condition in ΓM2 rather than an individual trajectory. The dynamics of a
system of about N ∼ 1023 particles are highly chaotic, in the sense that
even the slightest variation in the initial configuration can lead to consider-
able differences in the future evolution. In other words, nearby solutions of
the equations of motion will in general quickly and considerably diverge in
phase-space.4 Under the Hamiltonian time-evolution, the set of microstates
realizing M2 at the initial time will thus spread all over phase-space (respec-
tively a hypersurface of constant energy, see below) with the overwhelming
majority of microstates soon ending up in the equilibrium-region and only
a small fraction of special initial configurations evolving into other states of
equal or lower entropy.
All in all, the microscopic analysis tells us that it cannot be true that
every non-equilibrium configuration will follow the second law and undergo
an evolution of increasing entropy. We can, however, assert that typical
microscopic configurations, realizing a low-entropy initial macrostate, will
evolve into equilibrium and stay in equilibrium for most of the time. Simply
put, a macroscopic system in an “ordered” state will typically evolve into an
“unordered” state, because, due to the huge number of microscopic degrees
of freedom, there are just vastly many more possibilities to be in disorder
than to be in order.
3.2 The measure of typicality
Throughout this argument, the intuitive notions of almost all or extremely
special, that we used synonymously to typical/atypical, are understood in
terms of the stationary Liouville-measure, i.e. in terms of the phase-space
volume of the set of microstates with the respective property. Stationarity
of the measure, as asserted by Liouville’s theorem, means that the volume of
4In the case of an ideal gas, this microsopic instability comes only from the reflection
of particles on the walls of the box.
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a set of microstates is preserved under time-evolution, or, intuitively spoken,
that the Hamiltonian flow φt behaves like an incompressible fluid on phase-
space. Formally: |φt(A)| = |A| for all t ∈ R and all measurable sets A ⊆ Ω.
This is clearly an essential feature, for it implies that a) the notion of
typicality is timeless, i.e. a typicality statement does not depend on “what
time it is” and b) the Hamiltonian dynamics “care”, so to speak, about the
measure of the macro-regions that played such a central role in the argu-
ment. More precisely, statement b) can be understood in the sense that the
stationary measure, as a measure on initial conditions (at an arbitrary initial
time), carries over to a well-defined measure on solution trajectories, which
is such that the “number” of trajectories passing a phase-space region at any
given time is proportional to the size of that region.
Now, to be more precise, we would have to take into consideration that
for the discussion of a perfectly isolated system, only a small subset of phase-
space is actually relevant, because the evolution of its microstate is confined
to a hypersurface ΓE ⊂ Ω of constant energy E in virtue of energy conserva-
tion (and this total-energy will, in general, figure into the specification of a
system’s macrostate). In this case, the appropriate stationary measure is not
the Liouville measure, but the so-called microcanonical measure, correspond-
ing to the induced surface-measure on ΓE . For simplicity, we will usually
omit this distinction and simply refer to “phase-space” and the “measure” or
“size” of phase-space regions.
Turning back to Boltzmann’s explanation of the second law, we note
that the Liouville measure (respectively the microcanonical measure) as a
typicality measure serves two purposes in the argument:
1. To establish that the region of phase-space corresponding to the macrostate
M2 is very much larger than the region of phase-space corresponding to
the macrostate M1, and that the region of phase-space corresponding
to the equilibrium macrostate Meq is very much larger than the region
of phase-space corresponding to the macrostate M2, so large, in fact,
that it occupies almost the entire phase-space volume.
It is easy to learn about this “dominance of the equilibrium state”5,
and yet hard to appreciate what it is really saying, since the scale of
the proportions expressed by the innocuous term “almost entirely” are
beyond anything that we could intuitively grasp (just think of the ratio
1010
23
: 1 in our example).
5the term seems to have been introduced by (Frigg 2009).
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2. To define or realize a notion of typicality relative to the current macrostate
of the system, i.e. to allow us to assert that almost all initial conditions
in a non-equilibrium macro-region ΓM2 will evolve into equilibrium.
Regarding the meaning of “almost all”, one should note that it is only in
the idealized situation of a thermodynamic limit (where the number of
microscopic degrees of freedom goes to infinity) that one can expect the
exception set of “bad” configurations to be of measure zero, while if we
argue about a realistic system, the atypicality of such configurations
is substantiated by the fact that they have very very small (though
positive) measure compared to that of all microstates realizing M2.
In fact, stationarity of the Liouville measure allows us to estimate the
measure of the good microstates relative to the bad microstates in ΓM2
by the ratio of phase-space volume occupied by M2 to the phase-space
volume corresponding to states of lower entropy. For let B ⊂ ΓM2 be
the set of initial conditions that will have evolved into a lower-entropy
region ΓM1 after a time ∆t, then Φ∆t(B) ⊆ ΓM1 and thus |B| =
|Φ∆t(B)| ≤ |ΓM1 |, so that |B| : |ΓM2 | ≈ |ΓM1 | : |ΓM2 | ≈ 1 : 1010
23 .6
3.3 Irreversibility
By incorporating into our analysis what is essentially Boltzmann’s answer
to Loschmidt’s reversibility objection, we have, in fact, presented the resolu-
tion to the issue that seemed like the greatest challenge to our reductionist
enterprise: the prima facie contradiction between the irreversibility of ther-
modynamic processes and the reversibility of the underlying mechanical laws.
Let’s take a closer look at how this prima facie contradiction is resolved.
To this end, we recall that it was essential to our argument that it al-
ways referred to typical initial conditions relative to the initial macrostate. Of
course, in terms of overall phase-space volume a non-equilibrium macrostate
occupies a vanishingly small fraction of phase-space to begin with, corre-
sponding (if you will) to a very low a priori probability. Hence, the rele-
vant notion of typicality when discussing convergence to equilibrium from a
non-equilibrium macrostate M2 is defined by the Liouville measure (respec-
6Obviously, this number is so vanishingly small, that it doesn’t matter even if there are
just a few, a few thousand, or even millions of possible macrostates of lower entropy into
which the system could evolve from M2. One should note, however, that the relevance
of this estimate relies on the (well-founded) assumption that the macrostate of a system
changes on larger time-scales than its microscopic state, so that it’s legitimate to think of
the macroscopic evolution in discrete time-steps.
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tively the microcanonical measure) conditioned on the fact that the initial
microstate is in the respective phase-space region ΓM2 .
Now, as we already observed, the time-symmetry of the microscopic laws
manifests itself in the fact that the phase-space volume occupied by bad ini-
tial conditions in the equilibrium-region Γeq, initial conditions, that is, for
which the system will fluctuate out of equilibrium into the macrostate M2
(let’s say), is just as large as the phase-space volume occupied by the good ini-
tial conditions in ΓM2 for which the system will relax into equilibrium. (This
follows immediately from stationarity of the Liouville measure together with
its invariance under the time-reversal operation T : (q, p)→ (q,−p), revers-
ing the momentum of every particle.) In other words, over any given period
of time, there are just as many solutions that evolve into equilibrium, as there
are solutions evolving out of equilibrium into a lower entropy state, but the
first case is nevertheless typical for systems in non-equilibrium, whereas the
second case is atypical with respect to all possible equilibrium configurations
in Γeq.(An analogous reasoning applies if we compare two non-equilibrium
macrostates M2 and M1 with substantially different entropy.) It is this fact
and this fact alone that establishes the irreversibility of a thermodynamic
evolution.
Hence, while the issue of macroscopic irreversibility is certainly subtle,
mysterious it is not, and we can assure ourselves that our microscopic analysis
offers a clear and precise answer to every well-posed question characterizing
the phenomenon it is supposed to explain.
Q: Why do we find that systems in non-equilibrium evolve into equi-
librium, although we never see systems in equilibrium evolving into non-
equilibrium?
A: Because the evolution into equilibrium is typical for non-equilibrium
configurations, whereas equilibrium configurations evolving into non-equilibrium
(except for small fluctuations) are atypical.
Q: Why are we able to prepare macroscopic systems in states that, once
isolated, undergo an (autonomous) evolution of increasing entropy, but not
in states that will undergo an (autonomous) evolution of decreasing entropy?
A: Because the first task only requires the preparation of ordered, i.e.
low-entropic, macro-structures (which, remarkably enough, we are very good
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at), whereas the second task would require an exceedingly fine-tuned arrange-
ment of a huge humber of microscopic degrees of freedom. For instance, a
rather crude method such as “pushing a piston” is good enough to prepare a
gas in a low-entropy state. Almost every microscopic configuration that the
gas could end up in as a result of this procedure is then a microstate that will
evolve into equilibrium. However, although there are (in a measure-theoretic
sense) just as many equilibrium configurations that would evolve into non-
equilibrium, these are very particular and very exceptional ones out of all
the configurations that coarse-grain to “a gas in equilibrium”. The prepara-
tion of such a state would thus require precise control over roughly 6× 1023
microscopic degrees of freedom, which is practically impossible.
Q: Why does our reasoning, which is based on time-symmetric laws and
by which we conclude that a system in a low-entropy state will undergo an
evolution of increasing entropy not apply to the reversed motion of that very
same system?
A: Because the result of our analysis is a typicality statement and a
system that has evolved from a state of lower entropy is ipso facto atypical
with respect to its evolution in the reversed time-direction.
3.4 Past Hypothesis and the thermodynamic arrow
All in all, we see that it is impossible to understand macroscopic irreversibil-
ity without appreciating the fact that the “second law of thermodynamics”
is a typicality statement, rather than a necessary consequence of the micro-
scopic laws or the result of a logical inference about the behavior of any
individual system (see also the discussion in section 5.). And it is impossi-
ble to understand macroscopic irreversibility without appreciating the sense
in which non-equilibrium states are per se very special, since the thermody-
namic irreversibility that we have “derived” from time-symmetric microscopic
laws is only a result of the assumption – or preparation, or de facto existence
– of these special, i.e. low-entropy, (initial) macrostates. A typical config-
uration simpliciter, i.e. a typical configuration with respect to all possible
microstates is a state for which the system is in equilibrium, will be in equi-
librium for most of its future and has been in equilibrium for most of its past
– which again describes a perfectly time-symmetric situation.
Above we said that every well-posed question about macroscopic irre-
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versibility receives a clear and precise answer from Boltzmann’s statistical
mechanics. What we should have said, is that we are leaving aside one deep
question that is mostly – though not entirely – orthogonal to our discus-
sion. For if we follow our last thought, we see that the typicality account
is ultimately shifting the explanatory burden from why it is that systems
in non-equilibrium relax into equilibrium, to why it is that we find systems
in such special states in the first place. Of course, as long as we are deal-
ing with boxes of gas, or melting ice-cubes, or other confined systems, their
low-entropy (initial) states will always be attributable to influences from
“outside”, i.e. to the fact that these systems are actually part of some larger
system (possibly containing a physicist, or a freezer) before “branching off”
to undergo a (more or less) autonomous evolution as (more or less) isolated
subsystems. But this presupposes, of course, that these larger systems have
been out of equilibrium themselves, otherwise they could not have given rise
to subsystems with less then maximal entropy without violating the “second
law”. And if we think this through to the end, we finally arrive at the ques-
tion why it is that we find our universe in such a special state, far away from
equilibrium, much further, in fact, than it would have to be to account for
our existence and that of our galaxy. This is what (Goldstein 2001) calls the
hard part of the problem of irreversibility and it concerns, broadly speaking,
the origin of irreversibility and the thermodynamic arrow of time in our uni-
verse. Dealing with the “hard part” would require us to discuss the meaning
and the status and the intricacies of the Past Hypothesis7 stipulating a very
“ordered”, i.e. very low-entropy, initial state of our universe. But these ques-
tions are far beyond the scope of the present paper and hence shall not be
discussed any further (except for a brief remark in section 5, where the “hard
problem” is not completely disentangled from the focus of our discussion).
3.5 Recurrence
So far, we have stressed the fact that, as a conclusion of the microscopic anal-
ysis, it cannot be true that every non-equilibrium configuration will evolve
into equilibrium – only typical ones will. Now, we want to draw the atten-
tion to the fact that, as a conclusion of the microscopic analysis, we cannot
7The term “Past Hypothesis” is due to (Albert 2000), who also discusses its role in
ascertaining the reliability of records and grounding causal asymmetries. The necessity of
such an assumption was, however, already noted by Boltzmann in his lectures on gas theory
(Boltzmann 1896a, p. 252-253). See also (Feynman 1967) and the pertinent chapters
in (Carroll 2010) for a very comprehensible discussion.
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claim that a typical system will stay in equilibrium forever, but must rather
expect that the microstate, evolving in phase-space, will eventually re-enter
the non-equilibrium region, corresponding to the system fluctuating out of
equilibrium into a state of lower entropy. The most striking exemplifica-
tion of this fact is provided by Poincaré’s recurrence theorem, stating that
a typical solution of the microscopic dynamics will eventually revisit every
macro-region (of positive measure) it once passed, meaning, in particular,
that a system starting out in a low-entropy macrostate is bound to return to
this macrostate some time in the future. But the time-scales on which signif-
icant fluctuations out of equilibrium are to be expected are so astronomical
that they have no empirical relevance. For the gas-model, for instance, Boltz-
mann estimates the recurrence time to be about 101020 years8 – exceeding
the age of our universe by many orders of magnitude.
Figure 2: Typical entropy curves on physically relevant time-scales (left) and
on time-scales of the Poincaré cycles (right). Note that in the diagram on
the right, the proportions are not accurate. The periods of close-to-maximal
entropy are really vastly longer than the duration of low-entropy “valleys”.
Whereas we learned from Boltzmann’s typicality account and his reply to
Loschmidt’s reversibility objection that the explanation of irreversibility is
to an essential degree about initial conditions, we learn from his reply to the
recurrence objection of Zermelo and Poincaré that it is also essentially about
time-scales. The thermodynamic processes that we observe in our universe
and that we want to explain correspond to an entropy-evolution as depicted
8See (Boltzmann 1896b) for his illuminating reply to the recurrence objection and his
estimate of the recurrence times. Boltzmann does not actually give a numerical value, but
only notes that the coresponding number has “many trillion decimal places”.
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in the left diagram in Figure 2, that is, systems starting out in a low-entropy
state evolving into equilibrium and staying in equilibrium, except for small
fluctuations of the entropy about the maximum value. The characteristic
time-scale associated with this picture is that of the systems’ relaxation time
(the time it typically takes to reach equilibrium), which may be seconds for
the spreading of a gas, minutes for the cooling of a hot bowl of soup, many
years for the decay of radon and many billions of years9 for the heat death
of the universe. But all this is just the blink of an eye compared to the
time-scales of the Poincaré cycles for even the fastest reacting system. On
these time-scales, typical entropy curves will look qualitatively like the graph
on the right – which is, by and large, a time-symmetric picture.10 One will
often find discussions of the statistical mechanics and the “second law” being,
explicitly or implicitly, concerned with the diagram on the right rather than
the diagram the left (see also our discussion of ergodic theory in section 7.)
The reader should be aware that these discussions are then hopelessly out of
focus, since the time-scales associated with this diagram (i.e. the numbers
that we would have to write on the t-axis in any conventional units) are so
ridiculously huge that they have absolutely no empirical relevance.
4 Proving the second law? Typicality and the H-
theorem
Although the formula engraved on Boltzmann’s tombstone in Vienna is equa-
tion (1) connecting the entropy of a microstate with the “probability” of the
corresponding macrostate, his name is at least as intimately associated with
the Boltzmann equation and the H-theorem describing, in a more quanti-
tative manner, convergence to equilibrium for a low-density gas. This H-
theorem is of outmost interest in the light of our previous discussion for
once, because it illustrates very clearly the need for a typicality argument
9probably more like 10100 of years, which is about the time it takes for a black hole of
several solar masses to evaporate
10There are as many segments of increasing entropy as there are segments of decreasing
entropy, except of course for the initial slope. And the latter appears only if the initial
time actually marks the system’s (or the universe’s) beginning, otherwise we should extend
the picture analogously towards the past. This picture, pertaining to a universe whose
history extends infinitely into the past and into the future, is what Boltzmann considered
in his fluctuation hypothesis in an attempt to explain the low-entropy state of the uni-
verse without assuming a special, low-entropy beginning. Feynman calls this fluctuation
hypothesis “ridiculous” (Feynman 1967).
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and furthermore because it can be viewed as a concrete implementation of
the general scheme that we have presented before. In this context, we have
to counter a common misconception, that has most likely arisen from Boltz-
mann’s first presentation of the H-theorem and persisted despite his more
refined argumentation in later writings, namely that the H-theorem and the
probabilistic arguments are somehow competing accounts of macroscopic ir-
reversibility and the convergence to equilibrium. Huw Price, for instance,
writes with respect to the latter:
In essence, I think – although he himself does not present it in
these terms – what Boltzmann offers is an alternative to his own
famous H-Theorem. The H-theorem offers a dynamical argument
that the entropy of a non-equilibrium system must increase over
time, as a result of collisions between its constituent particles.
[...] The statistical approach does away with this dynamical ar-
gument altogether. (Price 2002, p. 27)11
We are convinced that the reason why Boltzmann did not present the “sta-
tistical approach” as an alternative to the H-theorem is that, in fact, it isn’t.
Understood correctly, there is a distinct conceptual continuity between the
H-theorem and the “typicality account” so that the latter does not appear as
a break with Boltzmann’s earlier work, but as a distillation of its essence.12
Understanding these connections, we will also see that many of the objec-
tions that are routinely raised against the conclusiveness of the H-theorem
are unfounded. To make this case, we shall first review what the H-theorem
is actually about and how it is grounded in the microscopic theory.13
Recall that the microstate of an N -particle system is represented by a
point X = (q1, ..., qN ; p1, ..., pN ) ∈ Ω in 6N -dimensional phase-space, com-
prising the position and momenta of all particles. The same state (modulo
permutations of the particles) can also be represented as N points in the 6-
dimensional µ-space, whose coordinates correspond to position and velocity
of a single particle, i.e. X → {(q1, v1), ..., (qN , vN )}, with vi := pi/m. The
H-theorem is concerned with the evolution of a function fX(q, v) on µ-space,
11See also the pertinent entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Uffink 2008)
which presents Boltzmann’s work in statistical mechanics as a series of rather incoherent
and ultimately wanting attempts to explain the second law.
12Cf. (Goldstein 2012). See also (Goldstein and Lebowitz 2004) for a mathematical
analysis corroborating this view.
13For a good introduction, see, for instance, (Davies 1977). For a detailed mathematical
treatment, see (Spohn 1991), (Villani 2002), (Lebowitz 1981).
17
sometimes called the macroscopic profile, that is supposed to provide an effi-
cient description of the most important (macroscopic) characteristics of the
gas in the microstateX. This function is defined as the empirical distribution
or coarse-grained density of points in µ-space. Intuitively, one can think of
dividing µ-space into little cells whose dimension is large enough to contain
a great number of particles, yet very small compared to the resolution of
macroscopic observations, and counting the relative number of particles in
each cell. For fixed q and v, fX(q, v) thus corresponds to the proportion of
particles located near q with velocity approximately v. In the limit where
the size of the cells go to zero, the empirical distribution becomes the actual
distribution
fX(t)(q, v) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ(q − qi(t)) δ(v − 1
m
pi(t)).
We are giving this formula to emphasize that, although fX(q, v) is tech-
nically a probability measure, there’s is absolutely nothing random about it.
It is more adequate to think of it as a macroscopic variable, determined, as
it always is, by the microscopic configuration of the system. (More precisely,
the usual macroscopic variables of state can be computed from this empirical
distribution.) Anyway, what’s essential here is that the distribution function
does not describe a random system or an ensemble of systems, but pertains
to a coarse-grained description of an individual system, so that every mi-
crostate X determines a unique fX(q, v), while many different microscopic
configurations will coarse-grain to one and the same µ-space density.
Now the first crucial result is that although the empirical distribution
can be different for different microscopic configurations X, it is in fact (more
or less) the same for an overwhelming majority of possible X. That is, one
can show that for typical X ∈ Γ, the distribution function is of the form
fX(q, v) ∝ e− 12mβv2 ,
for some constant β that is later identified with the inverse temperature of
the system. This is the famous Maxwell or Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution
which is hence the equilibrium distribution of the gas. The distribution
having no q-dependence means that the gas is homogeneously distributed
over the entire volume with no correlations between position and velocities,
i.e. with uniform temperature.
The goal of Boltzmann’s famous H-theorem is thus to show the con-
vergence of an initial non-equilibrium distribution f0(q, v) to the Maxwell-
distribution feq(q, v). The result is thereby based on three claims:
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1) For a low-density gas, the time-evolution of fX(t)(q, v) is well described
by an effective equation now known as the Boltzmann equation.
Starting with an initial distribution f0(q, v) = fX0(q, v), it is important
to distinguish the function fX(t)(q, v) – whose time-evolution is always
determined by that of the microstate X(t), i.e. fX(t)(q, v) is always the
empirical distribution for the system’s actual microscopic configuration
– from the solution f(t, q, v) of the Boltzmann equation with initial con-
dition f(0, q, v) = f0(q, v)14. The relevant claim is then that for typical
initial conditions, fX(t)(q, v) will be (in a precisely specified way) close to
f(t, q, v) for a sufficiently long period of time, thus providing an effective
description of the system’s time-evolution.
2) For a solution f(t, q, v) of the Boltzmann-equation, the H-function
H(f(t, q, v)) :=
∫
f(t, q, v) log f(t, q, v)dqdv
is monotonously decreasing in t.15
3) The H-functional reaches itsminimum for the Maxwell-distribution feq(q, v).
Together with 2) this implies, in particular, that the Maxwell-distribution
is a stationary solution of the Boltzmann-equation.
Statements 2) and 3) are fairly standard mathematical results. The crux
of the matter lies in statement 1). When Boltzmann first presented his H-
theorem in 1872, he argued that a diluted gas must evolve in accord with his
equation; He later had to mitigate this statement claiming, in effect, only
that it would typically do so. Indeed, we will see that 1), and therefore the
H-theorem, are genuinely typicality statements.
Boltzmann’s derivation of what is now known as the Boltzmann equation
is famously based on the Stoßzahlansatz or the assumption of molecular
chaos.16 This is an assumption about the relative frequencies of collisions17
14respectively a smooth approximation thereof.
15Whereas the “true” microscopic H of fX(t)(q, v) will fluctuate and only decrease “on
average”.
16Assumption, unfortunately, is not a perfectly accurate translation of the German word
Ansatz. Whereas the first is sometimes used synonymously with a premise, the later has a
distinctly pragmatic element and can refer to something more akin to an “approximation”
or a “working hypothesis”.
17The (effective) interaction potential of the particles in the gas is assumed to be very
short-range compared to their mean free path – this is the meaning of a “diluted” or “low-
density” gas. An event where two particles come close enough to each other to interact
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between the particles in the gas. Denoting by N (t, q; v1, v2) the number of
collisions happening near q in a small time-interval around t between particles
with velocity (approximately) v1 and v2, the Stoßzahlansatz is:
N (t, q ; v1, v2) ∝ N2 f(t, q, v1)f(t, q, v2) |v1 − v2| dtdq dv1dv2, (2)
i.e. the relative frequency of scattering events between particles of different
velocities happening in the cell around q is assumed to be proportional to the
density of particles with the respective velocities near the respective position.
As the mathematically trained reader will readily notice, the scattering prob-
ability being proportional to the product of f(t, q, v1) and f(t, q, v2) means
that particles of different velocities are assumed to be statistically indepen-
dent as they contribute to collisions. This is, more specifically, the meaning
of molecular chaos.
Boltzmann’s derivation, although a brilliant physical argument, was far
from a rigorous proof. There are many mathematical subtleties involved
in statement 1), concerning, for instance, the existence and uniqueness of
solutions to the Boltzmann equation. However, if we can generously overlook
these points, it is true that if and as long as the assumption of molecular
chaos, respectively equation (2), is valid, statement 1) is correct. Hence, we
have to ask: What is the status of molecular chaos and how is it justified?
It is important to keep in mind that there is really nothing random about
the particle interactions in a gas. Which particles are going to collide and
how they are going to collide is completely determined by the initial condi-
tions and the microscopic laws of motion. For the purpose of illustration,
let’s imagine that we could freeze the system at time t = 0 and arrange
the position and momentum of every single particle before letting the clock
run and the system evolve according to the deterministic laws of Newtonian
mechanics. We could then arrange the initial configuration of the system in
such a way that “slow” particles will almost exclusively scatter with other
“slow” particles and “fast” particles with other “fast” particles (or the other
way around). In fact, given that the gas is sufficiently diluted and the range
of the pair-interactions sufficiently small, we could even arrange the sys-
tem in such a way that the particles won’t “meet” at all. But such initial
configurations are, obviously, very special ones. For typical microscopic con-
is referred to as a “collision”. The potential is, of course, assumed to be repulsive. In the
hard sphere model, which is the simplest microscopic model for the Boltzmann equation,
a “collision” is quite literally a collision.
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figurations, coarse-graining to the initial distribution f0(q, v), we will find
that the relative frequency with which particles of different velocities “meet”
for the first collision is roughly proportional to the density of particles with
the respective velocities near the respective position, i.e. given by eq. (2).
This is nothing more and nothing less than the law of large numbers, based,
in effect, on simple combinatorics. Under the constraint that the number
of particles in a cell about (q, v) is given by N · f0(q, v), there are very few
possibilities to “arrange” the particles in such a way that (let’s say) each
particle meets another one with roughly the same velocity. In comparison,
there are vastly many more initial configuration for which the number of
particles with velocities v1 and v2 colliding near q within an (infinitesimally)
short time-interval is (roughly) proportional to N2f0(q, v1)f0(q, v2) |v1− v2|.
The validity of (2) at the initial time is thus (as all law-of-large-number
statements) a typicality statement and as such another mathematical fact.18
We can observe here the fundamental difference between the probability
density f(t, q, v) and the typicality measure. The “scattering probability”
at time t is defined in terms of f(t, q, v), but it is only for typical initial
conditions that the relative frequency of scatterings is actually close to the
expectation value. And typical initial conditions are defined, as usually, by
the Liouville-measure (respectively the microcanonical measure) restricted
to the initial macro-region ΓI := {X ∈ ΓE | fX(q, v) = f0(q, v)}.
This brings us, finally, to the critical part of the H-theorem. For as-
sume that after an (infinitesimal) time-interval ∆t for which the validity of
the Boltzmann-equation is established, the distribution function has evolved
into f(∆t, q, v). How do we know that (2) is still a good approximation for
all but a small set of initial conditions? It is still true that (2) is approxi-
mately satisfied for typical microscopic configurations realizing the current
distribution, i.e. counting all possible configurations that coarse-grain to
f(∆t, q, v). But we cannot “count” all these configurations, because the
microstates relevant to our considerations are constraint by the condition
that they have evolved from the macro-region corresponding to the initial
distribution f0(q, v). Mathematically, these dynamical constraints on the
“combinatorics” translate into the statement that the µ-space coordinates of
the particles at time t > 0 are no longer statistically independent, making it
questionable, for the time being, whether a law-or-large-number statement
18Note, by the way, that there is no issue here as to whether we let the clock run
“forwards” or “backwards” – the reasoning is perfectly symmetric with the respect to the
time-evolution in both time-directions.
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for the relative frequencies of particle collisions (i.e. molecular chaos) still
holds. This is, notably, the only meaningful way in which interactions build
up correlations. And we note, in particular, that the situation is still identi-
cal with respect to the time evolution towards the “future” as well as towards
the “past” of the distinguished initial state.
Now Boltzmann’s Stoßzahlansatz can be understood as the assumption
that statistical independence is preserved by the microscopic time-evolution,
or, in other words, that the relative frequency of collisions is always the
typical one with respect to the current empirical distribution (≈ the current
macrostate). The mathematician refers to such a proposition as propagation
of molecular chaos. Deriving the Boltzmann equation from a microscopic
model, in a rigorous mathematical sense, is thus to validate this ansatz, i.e.
to show that for typical initial conditions, equation (2) remains approximately
satisfied on sufficiently long time-scales, “sufficiently long”, that is, to describe
the thermodynamic evolution of a gas.
So, does molecular chaos propagate? That is, do the dynamics of a gas
preserve statistical independence well enough to justify the Stoßzahlansatz?
Based on physical intuition and various encouraging results, there is no rea-
sonable doubt that the answer affirmative. Given the fact that the micro-
scopic dynamics are highly chaotic, that the number of particles in a gas
is huge and the gas, by assumption, very diluted, so that problematic re-
collisions (collisions between particles that have already collided in the past)
are very rare, it is more than plausible that the relative frequency of col-
lisions shouldn’t become too special (in the sense of deviating significantly
from the expectation value given by eq. (2)), unless the initial configuration
itself was very special. And yet, this is extremely difficult to prove, as every
mathematician familiar with the problem can testify; so difficult, in fact,
that, as of to date, the best mathematical results available are valid only for
very short times and a very restricted class of particle-interactions.19 How-
ever, one should not be confused about the fact that these difficulties are
technical rather than conceptual in nature, and claims to the opposite, that
19See (Landford 1975) and (King 1975) for the landmark results and (Gallagher et.al.
2012), (Pulvirenti et.al. 2013) for recent extensions to more general interaction potentials.
We should note that in these proofs, which all follow the strategy of (Landford 1975), the
limiting factor, restricting the validity to a relatively short time-interval, is not, strictly
speaking, the propagation of molecular chaos, but rather the existence of the macroscopic
(Boltzmann-) dynamics. The two issues are, however, related (for mathematical reasons
that we cannot go into here) and which one will appear as the greater obstacle is likely to
depend on the strategy of proof.
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is, claims to the effect that there is something wrong with the Boltzmann
equation – or, for that matter, with Boltzmann’s justification of the equation
– are completely unfounded.
In this context, it is also important to understand that, unless one consid-
ers the thermodynamic limit of an infinitely large system, equation (2) will
hold at best approximately for all but a small set of “bad” initial conditions
(i.e. as a weak law-of-large-numbers statement), that this approximation
will get worse with time, and that the approximation is only good enough
until it isn’t. Eventually, a typical system will exhibit sizable fluctuations
out of equilibrium, at which point its evolution can no longer be adequately
described by the Boltzmann equation. It is as astonishing as it is unnec-
essary that after more than a century, there is still confusion about the
question how Boltzmann’s H-theorem squares with the recurrence objection
of Zermelo. The answer is simply that the Boltzmann equation is an effec-
tive description that cannot – and need not – be universally valid, and that,
moreover, the time-scales on which the Boltzmann equation is relevant have
nothing to do with the time-scales on which Poincaré recurrence is relevant.
All in all, we return to our initial point that the Boltzmann equation and
the H-theorem are not an “alternative” way to explain convergence to equilib-
rium and the irreversibility of thermodynamic behavior, but rather a concrete
exemplification of the explanatory scheme that we have presented before in
more general terms. Although the micro/macro distinction does not appear
as prominently in the formulation of the H-theorem, it is essential that the
empirical distribution f(q, v) pertains to a coarse-grained description of the
system, hence distinguishing a macro-region in phase-space consisting of all
microscopic configurations coarse-graining to the same µ-space density. Con-
vergence to equilibrium is then established for typical initial conditions with
respect to that initial non-equilibrium macro-region. And the equilibrium
state – characterized by the Maxwell-distribution to which non-equilibrium
distributions typically converge by virtue of the H-theorem – is, as always,
distinguished by the fact that it is the one realized by the overwhelming ma-
jority of all microscopic configurations. As Boltzmann himself beautifully
explained:
The ensuing, most likely state [...] which we call that of the
Maxwellian velocity-distribution, since it was Maxwell who first
found the mathematical expression in a special case, is not an
outstanding singular state, opposite to which there are infinitely
many more non-Maxwellian velocity-distributions, but it is, to the
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contrary, distinguished by the fact that by far the largest num-
ber of all possible states have the characteristic properties of the
Maxwellian distribution, and that compared to this number the
amount of possible velocity-distributions that deviate significantly
from Maxwell’s is vanishingly small. (Boltzmann 1896a, p. 252,
translation by the authors)
Despite the common focus on Stoßzahlansatz as the basic assumption in
Boltzmann’s derivation of his equation, there is a compelling case to make
that the tendency to equilibrium is by all means explained by the “dominance
of the equilibrium state”. (Although it will not appear among the premises
of the H-theorem, nor necessarily as an explicit part of the proof!) The
explanatory role of the Stoßzahlansatz is then somewhat subsidiary to this
insight, namely to express the fact that the “most likely” evolutions carry a
non-equilibrium distribution into equilibrium because almost all microstates
are equilibrium states.
Finally, and maybe most importantly, we understand that the irreversibil-
ity of the Boltzmann equation (as an effective description of a system’s
macro-evolution) is – as it cannot be otherwise – a consequence of the fact
that non-equilibrium configurations converging to equilibrium are typical
with respect to the corresponding “macrostate”, whereas microscopic con-
figurations leading to the time-reversed evolution are atypical with respect
to all equilibrium configurations, i.e. all microstates realizing the equilibrium
distribution feq(q, v).
One will often encounter the claim that the irreversibility of the Boltz-
mann equation is a result of the Stoßzahlansatz being an explicitly time-
asymmetric assumption (e.g. Uffink 2008, Price 1996, Price 2002). This
is not correct. There is nothing more time-asymmetric about equation (2)
than about the assumption that the probability of drawing a black ball and
a white ball from an urn is proportional to the number of black balls and to
the number of white balls that this contains as you draw. Of course, it would
be hard to see how a time-asymmetric assumption about scattering processes
described by reversible microscopic laws could ever be justified, but Boltz-
mann’s arguments contain no questionable ploys like that. The assumption
of molecular chaos breaks the time-symmetry only in the obvious (and nec-
essary) sense that it applies to the thermodynamic evolution but not to the
reversed motion; this, however, does not mean that any time-asymmetry is
smuggled into the derivation of the H-theorem in addition to the one intro-
duced by the assumption of a non-equilibrium initial distribution.
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This misunderstanding, we believe, is mostly based on the failure to
recognize molecular chaos, respectively the Stoßzahlansatz, as a typicality
statement. For typical initial conditions, equation (2) is equally valid for
the time-evolution in both temporal directions. However, the microscopic
configurations that have evolved from a state of lower entropy are ipso facto
atypical with respect to their evolution in the reversed, i.e. “past”, time
direction.
To put it differently, if the assumption of molecular chaos is justified in
the sense explained before, it will hold for typical initial configurations re-
alizing a non-equilibrium distribution, for which the H-theorem thus asserts
convergence of the distribution function to a Maxwellian distribution (to-
wards the future as well as towards the past) and it will also hold for typical
equilibrium configurations, for which the H-theorem thus asserts that the
equilibrium distribution is stationary. There is no reason, however, why it
must hold for those equilibrium configurations that are the time-reversal of
states that have just evolved from non-equilibrium, which are, after all, a
vanishingly small subset of the equilibrium region. And we know, of course,
that it doesn’t, that those states are precisely contained in the set of bad
configurations for which the particles are correlated in such a way as to
undergo a macro-evolution of decreasing entropy (increasing H) that can-
not be described by the Boltzmann equation. And we also know that the
atypicality of these states (with respect to their evolution in one temporal
direction) is explained by, or at least a necessary consequence of, the fact
that the system is assumed or constrained or observed to be in a special (i.e.
non-equilibrium) state at one particular moment in time.20
The only deeper question that may be left is why the Boltzmann equation
is in fact relevant, i.e. why it is a good description of an actual gas in our
actual world. To understand the answer to this question is thus to appreciate
the meaning and relevance of typicality statements.
20It may still seem that, since all collisions are reversible, it cannot be the case that
the time-reversal of a “good” configuration, for which (2) approximately holds, is a “bad”
configuration for which doesn’t. This is not correct, though, since the time-reverse of a
scattering process v1 + v2 → v′1 + v′2 is not −v1 + −v2 → −v′1 + −v′2, but −v′1 + −v′2 →
−v1 +−v2, that is, a reversal of the time-direction leads to completely different “pairings”
of incoming velocities in the scattering processes.
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5 Typicality and the status of macroscopic laws
5.1 The ‘logic’ of typicality statements
Concerning the philosophical community, one of the hurdles that may have
stood in the way of appreciating Boltzmann’s contribution and the relevance
of typicality is the fact that Nagelian schemes of reduction21 and the related
deductive-nomological models of physical explanation did not quite capture
the subtleties of Boltzmann’s arguments.22 According to these often criti-
cized yet very persistent theories, a microscopic explanation of the second
law of thermodynamics – respectively a reduction by the microscopic theory
– must be a derivation of the macroscopic law from the microscopic laws
plus suitably specified “auxiliary assumptions” or “circumstances” in which
the macroscopic law is supposed to hold. There is a sense in which this
characterization is correct, although to get a grip on what this sense is, we
will have to say more about what we mean by “derive” and what we mean by
a “macroscopic law”. First, we want to emphasize one of the more problem-
atic aspects of this view, which is that an understanding of the relationship
between the macroscopic regularity and the underlying microscopic laws in
purely logical terms misses the crucial role that initial conditions play in the
explanation of a macroscopic phenomenon.
For what is it to derive the thermodynamic behavior of (let’s say) a gas
from the microscopic laws of motion? Is it to show that there exists at least
one microscopic configuration for which the gas will relax to equilibrium?
Is it to show that it will happen for all possible (non-equilibrium) config-
urations? The insufficiency of the first statement and the falsehood of the
second must severely question the adequacy of purely deductive schemes of
explanation. For suppose we wanted to account for the thermodynamic
behavior of a certain type of physical system by a scheme of the form
∀x(F (x) ⇒ G(x)), where x ranges of all possible realizations of the cor-
responding microscopic model and the predicate G is a suitable formulation
of “showing effectively/approximately thermodynamic behavior”. Then the
antecedent F (x) would have to contain a clause more or less equivalent to
the statement “The initial conditions of the system x are such that G(x)”.
But then the deduction becomes too trivial to be relevant. Of course there
21For a recent defense of this schemes, see (Dizadji-Bahmani et.al. 2010).
22Physicists and philosophers who did appreciate the relevance of typicality and have
written about it include (Maudlin 2007,Bricmont 2001,Dürr 2009,Goldstein 2012,Zanghì
2005). We owe many of the thoughts expressed in this paper to their teachings.
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exist initial conditions for which the gas will expand. There are also initial
conditions for which the gas will contract. And (possibly) initial conditions
for which the gas will transform into a banana. In other words, for a sys-
tem x with sufficiently many degrees of freedom and sufficiently non-trivial
dynamics it will practically always be possible to maintain that it has the
(macroscopic) property G because the initial conditions were such that G(x).
The only thing that can provide explanatory value in this context is the as-
sertion of typicality, i.e. the assertion that G is not a feature of certain special
initial conditions, but a physical fact that would arise from almost any ini-
tial condition. This is also to assure that the explanatory work is done,
as much as possible, by the fundamental laws, rather than some fine-tuned
arrangement of microscopic degrees of freedom.23
Note however that the relevant statement is now, logically and syntacti-
cally, a proposition about G rather than a proposition about any particular
x. The “logic” of the statistical explanation of the second law is thus not
to state a set of (statistical) assumptions about an individual system from
which to infer its thermodynamic behavior, but to spell out a physical ac-
count that grounds the explanation of thermodynamic behavior in the notion
of typicality.24
5.2 Typicality vs. probability
Now clearly, the more common way of speaking is not to say that a macro-
scopic feature G (a certain type of macro-evolution, a statistical regularity,
a numerical relation between macroscopic variables of state, etc.) is typical,
but that G(x) is very likely or that we infer G(x) with high probability. The
tricky thing about this way of speaking, though, is that while almost every-
body will consent that it is saying something right and relevant, it is hard to
23Thanks to Jenann Ismael for this insight.
24We note that a superficial look on the modus operandi of statistical mechanics may
be deceptive here. Indeed, a quantitative derivation of a thermodynamic law will often be
based on a statistical hypothesis about the distribution of certain microscopic quantities
or events within an individual system (or sometimes an ensemble of systems) – think of
Boltzmann’s Stoßzahlansatz or the assumption of isotropically distributed particle veloci-
ties that enters the derivation of the ideal gas law. However, as we have demonstrated for
the Stoßzahlansatz in section 4 the “statistical hypothesis” itself is ultimately justified by
the fact that the assumed distribution of microscopic quantities is that of a typical con-
figuration (respectively a typical ensemble) with respect to the corresponding macrostate.
The derivation of a thermodynamic law is then, again, most aptly understood as a result
about typical systems, rather than a (logical or probabilistic) inference about a particular
system.
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get to people to agree on what exactly that is. Indeed, such a probabilistic
statement concerning a “macroscopic law” must raise two additional ques-
tions: a) what is it supposed to mean? and b) how did we accomplish the
feat to derive a probabilistic result from deterministic microscopic laws?
We cannot discuss here in detail how the different “interpretations” of the
concept of probability (subjectivist, frequentist, etc.) fare in this context,
but want to make a few general points to capture the intricacy of the issue.
1) It would seem rather odd (and detached from scientific practice) if in order
to account for the second law of thermodynamics we would have to add to
the mechanical laws a quantitative assumption about the distribution of
initial conditions of boxes of gas, or the like, that we find in our universe.
2) The fact that we are generally ignorant about the the exact microstate
of a system is true, but largely irrelevant. It is absurd to think that the
validity of the second law of thermodynamics could in any way depend
on what we know or believe or are able to observe.
3) Finally, if we are serious about our commitment to argue within the
paradigm of a particular deterministic theory, we have to take it to the
conclusion that there is nothing more “random” about the physical pro-
cesses in the universe that give rise to subsystems (e.g. boxes of gas) in
non-equilibrium configurations, than about the entropy-increasing pro-
cesses going on within these subsystems, once they are suitably isolated
and free of macroscopic constraints. Eventually one has to wonder why
it is true as a matter of fact that whenever someone prepares a gas in a
low-entropy state, it never ends up in one of the “bad” microscopic config-
urations for which the gas would contract rather than expand. And then
one has to take seriously the fact that an act of “preparation” is itself a
physical process, following the same set of physical laws, with its outcome
determined by suitably specified initial conditions. Why are these initial
conditions always good ones, then? To defer the source of randomness
to the outside, from the box of gas to the shaky hands of the experimen-
talist or to exterior perturbations preventing the subsystem from being
perfectly isolated, is just to pass the buck. But the buck must stop, even-
tually, with the universe itself. For the universe is what it is, it exists
once and only once, there is nothing before and nothing outside. And
we either live in a universe that obeys the second law of thermodynamics
(on cosmological scales and, with the possibility of very rare exceptions,
in its branching sub-systems) or we don’t.
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So, all that said, what is the difference between a statement of probabil-
ity and a typicality statement, and why is typicality the more appropriate
concept in this context?
For once, it is important to note that, contrary to the conventional use
of probabilities, typicality is not a quantitative concept. The role of the
typicality measure is only to realize and give precise meaning to the notion of
“almost all” or “the overwhelming majority of” initial conditions and although
it is common and convenient and natural to use the Liouville-measure, at
least in the context of classical mechanics, many different measures would
yield the same notion of typicality.25 In particular, we are not committed
to giving meaning to the exact number that the typicality measure assigns
to every (measurable) subset of phase-space. The only “probabilities” that
are meaningful in this context are 1 (or those close to 1) and 0 (or those
close to 0), indicating what Bernoulli (1713) called moral certainty or moral
impossibility.26
Furthermore, in making a typicality statement, we do not commit our-
selves to talking about actual or hypothetical ensembles of systems, nor do
we use probabilistic concepts to express our “guess” (that is, information or
knowledge or believe) about the actual (current or initial) microstate of a
system. A typicality statement refers to nothing more and nothing less than
the fact that a certain (coarse-grained/macroscopic) property or feature or
behavior of a physical system is typical according to the microscopic laws, i.e.
that it is the kind of feature or property or behavior that our fundamental
theory predicts for an overwhelming majority of microscopic configurations
compatible with appropriately specified (macroscopic) boundary conditions:
Typically, a coin tossed repeatedly for a large number of times will land about
as often on heads as on tails. Typically, an ice cube at room temperate will
melt. According to the laws of quantum mechanics, a collection of point-
particles, shot successively through a double-slit, will typically (though not
25On the other hand, many measures would yield a different notion of typicality. One
can think, for instance, of singular measures, concentrated on a single point in phase-space.
Such a measure may even turn out to be stationary, in case that this particular microstate
happens to be a stationary point of the dynamics. So why not take such a measure to
define “typicality”, meaning that a property is typical if and only if it is instantiated by
this one particular configuration? We trust the reader to answer this question for himself.
26Such typicality statements can be understood in the sense of Cournot’s principle,
which is one of the basic principles underlying the philosophy of probability of Kol-
mogorov’s “Grundbegriffe”, but also stands in the philosophical tradition of great mathe-
maticians such as Emile Borel, Maurice Fréchet or Paul Lévy. See (Shafer and Volk 2006)
for a beautiful essay about this topic.
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necessarily) display an interference pattern when registered on a screen be-
hind the slits. According to classical mechanics, it typically won’t (although
it possibly might).
A typicality statement is thus an objective physical fact, in principle
derivable from the fundamental (microscopic) laws that we take as the basis
of our considerations. (It is a fact that, by the way, even Laplace’s demon
should care about, to the degree that he cares about physics as a science and
a means to understand the world.) But what exactly is it a fact about? Well,
typicality is, first and foremost, the answer to the question that stood at the
very beginning of this chapter and, in fact, our entire discussion, namely:
What is the connection between the macroscopic regularities that we want
to account for and the underlying microscopic laws? Another way to put it
is to ask: What is the nomological status of the (so called) ‘macroscopic’ or
‘statistical’ laws?
5.3 Typicality and the status of macroscopic laws
Philosophically, the truly remarkable (yet often unacknowledged) aspect
about the probabilistic character of thermodynamic laws is not the way in
which laws that once have been thought to be exact turn out to be merely
“approximately” true (that is, to hold only effectively or “very likely”), but
the way in which the empirical regularities expressed by these laws turn out
to be contingent rather than necessary truths about the world that we live
in. In other words, if we accept the microscopic laws as fundamental, we
have to accept that the so called “macroscopic laws”, even in an approximate
or statistical sense, are in fact no laws at all in that they lack the status of
nomological necessity. For all we know, the initial conditions of our universe
could have been such that systems, prepared or created in a low-entropy
state, would regularly end up on one of the “bad” trajectories that undergo
an anti-thermodynamic evolution of decreasing entropy. That is to say that
there are possible Newtonian universes in which gases are often found to con-
tract rather than expand, in which heat does sometimes flow from a colder
to a hotter body and in which macroscopic objects such as balls and chairs
and tables do occasionally jump up in the air (while cooling off accordingly
to account for the conservation of energy) simply because a large number of
particles happened to move in the same (upward) direction at the same time.
In these counterfactual but nomologically possible universes, it is simply not
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true that such events are very unlikely, because they happen “all the time”.27
And yet, we would insist, it is more than a mere contingency, more than
a factum brutum that our universe is not like that. And indeed, our physical
theory has more to say here – fortunately without assigning us the impossible
task of determining the actual boundary conditions of our universe – for it
tells us that the initial conditions of a Newtonian universe would have to
be exceedingly special to give rise to subsystems violating thermodynamic
laws as more than astronomically rare exceptions. Thermodynamic laws,
in other words, are statistical regularities of typical universes. And it is this
characterization, we suggest, that specifies their connection to the underlying
microscopic laws and grounds their own “law-like” status.
In (Kripke 1972), Saul Kripke famously explained the difference be-
tween logical and nomological (or natural) supervenience by the following
metaphor: B-properties supervene logically on A-properties if, after fixing
the A-properties of the world, there was nothing else God could or needed to
do for fixing the B-properties. The A-properties, we say, logically entail the
B-properties. In case of a nomological supervenience, however, God, after
making sure of the A-facts, still had some work to do for making sure of the
B-facts by determining laws of nature, relating B-properties to A-properties.
Going one step further, we can say: the properties of our world that are typ-
ical for these laws, are facts and regularities for which God, after fixing the
laws of nature and the fundamental ontology of the world, still had a little
bit of work to do in choosing appropriate initial conditions for our universe
to ensure that these properties are realized. However, he barely had to pay
any attention to this choice, since almost every initial condition he could
have picked (compatible with certain macroscopic constraints he had settled
on) would have been fine. For instance, after deciding to create a universe
hospitable to the kind of ordered macro-structures that we find in ours, and
after deciding to impose on this universe the kind of fundamental laws that
we find to hold in ours, God, in principle, still had a choice as to whether
or not this universe should also abide by the second law of thermodynamics.
However, almost every possible choice of initial conditions (compatible with
the Past Hypothesis, see below) would have lead to a universe in which the
27Of course, among all possible Newtonian universes there will be many with no ther-
modynamic arrow and no interesting structures at all, but here, to make a point, we
consider universes that are hospitable to intelligent life, but in which the second law of
thermodynamics fails to hold in branching systems just so often as to make a fool out of
physicists.
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second law, as in ours, describes a true statistical regularity – whereas God
would have to be utterly malicious to arrange the initial configuration of the
universe in such a way that it doesn’t.
Typicality, we remark, is a very general way of understanding statistical
regularities supervening on deterministic laws. Consider, for instance, the
stock example of the coin toss. For all we know, the initial conditions of
our universe could have been such that almost every coin ever to be tossed
landed on ‘heads’ rather than ‘tails’, or such that ‘heads’ came out twice
as often as ‘tails’, or three times more often, or so on... But such initial
conditions are, of course, atypical. Hence, if we believe that there is some
deep, explanatory connection between the (rotational) symmetry of the me-
chanical laws, the symmetry of a balanced coin and the empirical fact that
the frequency of ‘head’ and ‘tails’ in a sufficiently long series of coin tosses
comes out approximately 50:50, this connection is given by typicality – at
least, we wouldn’t know how else.28.
Returning to the more intricate issue of the second law of thermodynam-
ics, we have to note one subtlety in connection with the Past Hypothesis,
the assumed low-entropy initial state of the universe that is supposed to
account for the origin of low-entropy structures, the reliability of records,
and so on (Albert 2000). According to the Past Hypothesis, the initial
macrostate of our universe was a very special one, marking one end of the
thermodynamic arrow of time. Nevertheless, with respect to this low-entropy
macrostate, the initial microscopic configuration of the universe was typical,
explaining the increase of entropy in the universe as a whole and in any of
its branching subsystems. All in all, there is thus not a contradiction, but
a distinct tension between the typicality account and the Past Hypothesis
and the resolution of this tension is considered by many as one of the most
profound problems of modern physics.29
So, what else is left to say? Not much, we believe. To understand that
a certain regularity is typical and yet to wonder why it is that we observe
this regularity in nature (and why we should expect this regularity to persist
28For typicality as a way to understand “deterministic probabilities” in physics, see
(Maudlin 2007), (Dürr 2009), (Zanghì 2005)
29See, for instance, the discussion in (Penrose 1999) and his “Weyl curvature hypothesis”
as a proposal for an additional law restricting the possible initial states of the universe,
but also (Callender 2004) arguing from a Humean perspective against the need for further
“explanation” of the Past Hypothesis. See (Carroll 2010) for a very readable and compre-
hensive discussion of the problem and (Carroll 2010) as well as (Carroll and Chen 2004)
for attempt to dispose of the Past Hypothesis altogether.
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in the future) is to ask why, in fact, our universe is typical, i.e. why it
is, in this particular respect, like the overwhelming majority of all possible
universes instantiating the same set of fundamental physical laws. And while
we don’t know how to answer (except maybe with Einstein’s bon mot that
“God is subtle, but he is not malicious”) the very question seems to us utterly
uncompelling. Explanations have to end somewhere. If we can establish
that a certain property is typical of a particular kind of system, this should
elevate any sense of wonder or mystery or puzzlement that one might have
had upon finding such a system instantiating the respective property. Hence,
we should consider the phenomenon to be reasonably and conclusively and
convincingly explained on the basis of the microscopic laws. Similarly, if we
can establish that certain macroscopic feature or behavior or regularity is
typical for a certain kind of system, then we should by all reasonable means
expect to find this feature or behavior or regularity realized in a given system
of said kind. Hence, it constitutes a prediction of the microscopic theory.
In this fashion, typicality statements figure in a way of reasoning about
nature. In fact, since the situation we find ourselves in towards the world is
necessarily one in which all we can ever hope to know about its physical state
is compatible with a plurality of fundamental, i.e. microscopic, matters of
fact, the relevant explanatory and behavior guiding statements that we can
extract from the fundamental laws of physics are virtually always results
about typical solutions of their equations of motion.
We shall emphasize once again that a typicality reasoning is a non-
deductive reasoning. Logically, the fact that something has been shown to
be typical doesn’t imply anything about any particular instance. In other
words, it is always possible for a particular system – and ultimately our uni-
verse – to be atypical in the relevant respect. But facts that strike us a
atypical are usually the kind of facts that cry out for further explanation.
This is why a Casino manager has not just economic interest but reasonable
grounds to suspect cheating if a player hits three jackpots in a single night.
And this is why scientific practice would eventually require us to revise our
theory and look for different laws, rather than endorsing an explanation
based on special initial conditions, or, if you will, a streak of bad luck. In
the end, it is not logically but epistemically inconsistent to accept a certain
physical theory and accept at the same time that our universe is somehow
an atypical model of that theory, for this would undermine any reasons to
endorse the theory in the first place.30
30As was put so nicely by Mathias Frisch (private communication).
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5.4 A comment on the ‘measure zero problem’
Despite the many subtleties involved in the concept of typically that would
require a much deeper philosophical investigation than we can provide here,
we believe this way of reasoning to be very natural and intuitive and very
much in line with common scientific practice. Nevertheless, it seems to us
that quite a lot of misunderstandings about Boltzmann’s statistical mechan-
ics are actually misunderstandings about the “logic” of typicality statements.
More concretely, we have found that one of the most common sources of con-
fusion about the typicality account is simply to miss the difference between
a typicality statement and a statement about particular instances. Consider
for instance the objection of Roman Frigg in reply to (Goldstein 2001):
[...]Goldstein suggests that a system approaches equilibrium sim-
ply because the overwhelming majority of states in ΓE are equilib-
rium microstates; in other words, it approaches equilibrium sim-
ply because equilibrium microstates are typical and non-equilibrium
microstates are atypical (with respect to ΓE and µ). [...] This is
wrong. If a system is in an atypical microstate (which it is by
the Past Hypothesis), it does not evolve into a equilibrium mi-
crostate just because the latter are typical; typical states do not
automatically function as attractors. (Uffink 2007, 979–980) pro-
vides the following example. Consider a trajectory x(t), i.e. the
set {x(t) = φt(x(t0)) | t ∈ [t0,∞)}, a set of measure zero in ΓE.
Its complement, the set ΓE \ x(t) of points not laying on x(t),
has measure one. Hence the points on x(t) are atypical while
the ones not on x(t) are typical (with respect to ΓE, µ, and the
property ‘being on x(t)’). But from this we cannot conclude that
a point on x(t) eventually has to move away from x(t) and end
up in Γ \ x(t); in fact the uniqueness theorem for solutions tells
us that it does not. The moral is that non-equilibrium states do
not evolve into equilibrium states simply because there are over-
whelmingly more of the latter than of the former, i.e. because the
former are atypical and the latter are typical. It does not some-
how lie in the ‘nature’ of atypical states to evolve into typical
ones. (Frigg 2009, pp. 8–9).
Before we comment on this objection, we have to make the cautionary remark
that the way in which we have used the term “typical” throughout this paper
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is somewhat different from its use in Roman Frigg’s elaboration. There
is, of course, a sense in which it is correct to say that equilibrium states
are typical and non-equilibrium states atypical with respect to all possible
configurations of the system. The relevant statement would then be that
typical non-equilibrium configurations will evolve into such a typical state, or
that typical trajectories will spend most of the time in typical states. In our
discussion, we have been careful to use the notion of “typicality” only in the
latter sense, referring to initial conditions, respectively solution-trajectories
conditioned on a given initial macrostate – a distinction which unfortunately,
seems to have gone unappreciated by Frigg, but may have helped to resolve
his dissatisfaction.
Of course, no one is claiming, in the naive sense implied by Frigg, that
any specific trajectory will move to equilibrium “simply because” equilib-
rium states are “typical” – just as no one claims that any specific lottery
ticket must lose “ simply because” loosing lottery tickets are typical. In the
alluded sense, a lottery ticket looses “simply because” someone picked the
wrong numbers and a system converges to equilibrium “simply because” its
actual micro-evolution carries the microscopic configuration into an equilib-
rium state. The relevant assertion here is that the regions of space-time that
do not correspond to the thermodynamic equilibrium are extremely special.
And the claim is then that trajectories that wander around in phase-space
yet remain confined for an extensive amount of time to those extremely spe-
cial regions of phase-space will turn out to be themselves extremely special.
And what this means, in other words, is that typical non-equilibrium states
will evolve into equilibrium on relatively short time-scales and that typical
equilibrium states will remain in equilibrium (or close to equilibrium) over
very long periods of time.
So what is the point of the “counterexample” formulated by Jos Uffink
that made such an impression on Roman Frigg? It is obviously correct that
a solution x(t) of the equations of motion will never enter the phase-space
region ΓE \x(t) despite the fact that this particular region is a set of measure
1, thus covering almost the entire available phase-space. Typical solutions,
however, will. In fact, it follows from the “uniqueness theorem” that every
other solution (with the same total energy) lies entirely in the set ΓE \ x(t).
So, leaving aside the fact that this artificially crafted region of phase-space
is of no physical interest whatsoever, it is not clear what this example is
actually supposed to demonstrate. With all due respect, the debate seems
a bit like people trying to explain that a typical lottery ticket will fail to
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win the jackpot because of the huge number of combinations that could be
drawn, and Frigg and Uffink running around with a winning lottery ticket
in order to disprove them.
If Uffink’s example works at all, then as another instance of the so-called
“measure zero problem” which is basically the observation that, as soon as
one goes to a more fine-grade description, any physical system is found to
be atypical with respect to some (more or less natural) properties. In par-
ticular, for a continuous state-space and a nonsingular measure, the actual
microscopic configuration and (as we have just noted) even the entire trajec-
tory of a system will generally constitute a set of measure 0. Although this
observation receives ongoing interest from part of the philosophical commu-
nity and is often presented as a serious objection to typicality arguments
(for instance by Frigg himself (p.23), but see also (Sklar 1993)), we don’t
think that it causes much of an embarrassment for the reasoning that we
have presented.31
There are facts and regularities that can be explained on the basis of the
fundamental laws of physics by virtue of being typical (like the frequency of
‘head’ and ‘tail’ in long series of coin-tosses being approximately 50 : 50).
There are contingent facts about physical systems that are not typical, yet
can be explained in a different sense – usually by tracing them back to
other (even more) special states of affair. For instance, the state of our
office is certainly atypical with respect to the exact distribution of objects
on the desk – there are countless possibilities how any of the objects could
be placed slightly differently, or replaced by some other object – but we can
tell some sort of causal story about how a used coffee mug ended up near
the keyboard and how the battered blue book came to lie on top of the
heavier red one. And finally there are facts like the one that a trajectory
through some physical state-space will never cross its complement – which do
not require further explanation, but seem well-suited for creating confusion
where none is due.
6 The role of the dynamics
6.1 The role of mathematics
Statistical mechanics is often taken as the epitome of a (successful) reduc-
tionist enterprise in physics. The main goal of such an enterprise is to assure
31Thanks to Tim Maudlin for very helpful discussions on this issue.
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logical and conceptual consistency between different levels of description of
the physical world. To this end, the physical analysis has to tell us how
the macroscopic regularities, described by the second law of thermodynam-
ics, can be justified or explained on the basis of the underlying microscopic
theory. By which standards are we supposed to evaluate such an account,
though? According to the most prominent philosophical position, a micro-
scopic explanation of a macroscopic regularity, respectively a reduction by
the microscopic theory, is supposed to be a derivation of the macroscopic law
from the microscopic laws plus suitably specified “auxiliary assumptions” or
“circumstances” in which the macroscopic law is supposed to hold. And al-
though these deductive-nomological models of explanation (and the related
Nagelian schemes of physical reduction) have been regularly criticized and
rejected for various reasons, their basic understanding of what it is that a
microscopic description has to achieve in order to provide an account of a
macroscopic regularity has remained quite pervasive. We don’t mean to get
involved in the larger debate taking place in the philosophy of science, to
which more competent people have made more elaborate contributions, but
make a rather simple point as to why we think this understanding can turn
out to be quite debilitating for the issue at hand.
Clearly, a lot hangs on the notion of a “derivation” and one should note
that the term can in practice mean something different for a physicist than
for a mathematician or a logician, depending on the degree of rigor that it
is supposed to imply. If, however, we side with the latter on this issue and
understand the term in the strict sense as referring to a logical deduction
from precisely stated premises or axioms, i.e. a mathematical proof about
a precisely specified microscopic model, it is just utterly naive to think that
this is even within our means when we are dealing with complex macroscopic
phenomena involving about 6 × 1023 microscopic degrees of freedom (after
all, even simplifying assumptions would ultimately have to be justified or
proven on the basis of the microscopic theory). And even in a suitably spec-
ified thermodynamic limit (where the number N of particles goes to infinity
and other quantitates in the microscopic model scale accordingly), proving
convergence to equilibrium for a more or less realistic microscopic model re-
mains an extremely difficult and largely unresolved problem of mathematical
physics.That aside, the mathematical physicist and the physically minded
mathematician know very well that not every explanation can be turned
into a proof and that not every proof is explanatory. In practice, the “de-
ductive” process that bridges the gap between the simplicity and precision of
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the fundamental laws and the intricacy and complexity of the physical world
is rarely just a series of precise assumptions and logical inferences – and in
fact is not supposed to be. For whereas it lies in the nature of mathematical
proof and logical deduction that the truth of the conclusion depends rigidly
on the truth of the premises (the former is a “truth-preserving function” of
the latter) it is essential for a good physical explanation to be robust against
small “perturbations” of the underlying assumptions, which, after all, may
themselves arise from a process of approximation and idealization without
even the aspiration of factual truth.32
This realization, which stands somewhat antithetically to the neat meta-
scientific theories of the logical positivists, leads to a series of interesting
questions, for instance: What can we learn from a mathematical proof ap-
plying (let’s say) to a class of “well-behaved” interaction potentials which,
however, does not include any of the potentials that we believe to model
real-life systems most realistically? What, for instance, do we learn about
the thermodynamic behavior of a gas by studying a “hard-sphere model”,
since no one actually believes that gas-molecules behave exactly like tiny
billiard balls?
To develop an answer to these questions would lead us far beyond the
scope of this paper. What we mean to demonstrate, though, is that the rela-
tionship between physical understanding and mathematical proof, between
explanation and derivation of a (macroscopic) phenomenon is, for a vari-
ety of reasons, much more complicated than has often been acknowledged.
Anyway, the typicality account that we have presented in this paper is an
explanation or an explanatory scheme – not a proof. It tells us what it is
that we would have to prove, if a rigorous mathematical theorem is what
we are after, but it is neither able, nor intended, nor pretending to short-
cut any of the great technical challenges that constitute such an endeavor.
Overcoming these challenges and proving the thermodynamic evolution of
a suitably complex system is the kind of feat that would get you a Fields
Medal (provided you’re young enough, of course). Whether it would give
you a better understanding of the second law of thermodynamics is, again,
a different question.
32See (Schwartz 1992) for a beautiful elaboration on this point.
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6.2 The role of the dynamics. A reply to critics
The reason for making all these general remarks is that we are irritated by
the kind of criticism that the typicality account has been facing from sev-
eral authors, who have strongly rejected this explanation of the second law
of thermodynamics for a lack of mathematical rigor and an alleged failure
to make precise the “dynamical assumptions” on which the argument rests.
Roman Frigg and Charlotte Werndl even go as far as declaring that the typ-
icality account is “mysterious” because the “connection with the dynamics”
is unclear (Frigg and Werndl 2013, p. 918).
Jos Uffink writes on a similar note (as a conclusion to his “counter-example”
recited by Frigg and discussed in the previous section):
[I]n order to obtain any satisfactory argument why the system
should tend to evolve from non-equilibrium states to the equilib-
rium state, we should make some assumptions about its dynamics.
In any case, judgments like ‘reasonable’ or ‘ridiculous’ remain
partly a matter of taste. The reversibility objection is a request
for mathematical proof (which, as the saying goes, is something
that even convinces an unreasonable person). (Uffink 2007, p. 61)
We have both very much and very little to say about these objections. For
once, while Uffink is entitled to his epistemic standards, we can only repeat
our point that there are usually good reasons to settle for physical expla-
nations that are conclusive enough to convince a reasonable person. If as
an explanation of a macroscopic phenomenon we accepted nothing short of
rigorous mathematical proof, the atomic hypothesis would yet have to earn
its merits.
What is less a matter of epistemic standards and more a matter of keep-
ing separate things separate is the reference to the reversibility objection that
Uffink makes in the same breath. For the reversibility objection, we would
insist, is not so much a “request for mathematical proof” as a request for a
conclusive explanation of macroscopic irreversibility – or so it was in 1874.
Boltzmann gave a perfectly conclusive answer soon after (at least conclusive
enough to convince a reasonable person, to borrow Uffink’s terminology) and
we now have a very good understanding of how irreversible macroscopic be-
havior can arise from reversible microscopic dynamics. Producing a rigorous
result about the macroscopic behavior of a realistically complex model is a
very different issue, involving a very different set of (technical) problems,
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and the reversibility objection is actually not one of them. (And even if it
was, it is not clear why “an assumption about the dynamics” would be of
any help, since one thing that the microscopic dynamics certainly are, by
assumption, is reversible.)
All in all, it is not clear what exactly Uffink is confused about: typicality,
irreversibility, a lack of mathematical precision, or the role of the dynamics.
It just seems to be a lot. Frigg and Werndl, very much to their credit, state
more clearly what they have in mind. In (Frigg and Werndl 2013) they
explain:
In recent years several proposals have been put forward, which aim
to justify (something akin to) TD-like [thermodynamic-like] be-
haviour in terms of typicality (see, for instance, Goldstein 2001).
[...] This programme is on the wrong track. [...] Not all phase
flows lead to TD-like behaviour (for instance, a system of har-
monic oscillators does not). So the phase flows that lead to TD-
like behaviour are a non-trivial subclass of all phase flows on a
given phase space, and the question is how this class can be char-
acterised. [...] What we need is a non-trivial specification of a
property that only those flows that give raise to TD-like behaviour
possess. [pp. 4–5]
Such demands, however, are also much less reasonable than it might seem.
For starters, it is good to keep in mind that we are not actually concerned
with dynamical system theory other than as a mathematical tool for where
it’s useful, that is, we do not really care about measure-preserving flows
on phase space in general, but always have in mind a phase-flow generated
by a huge number of interacting particles, constituting the kind of macro-
scopic system that we want to describe. Obviously, whenever we study a
particular model, whether it possesses the appropriate characteristics, i.e.
whether it describes a gas rather than a fluid – or nothing interesting at
all – and whether it exhibits the right thermodynamic behavior will in the
end depend on the Hamiltonian, comprising the particle interactions and
determining the system’s time-evolution. On the other hand, we understand
from Boltzmann’s analysis that the explanation of thermodynamic behavior
is extremely robust against the details of the microscopic model, precisely be-
cause it doesn’t hinge on any narrowly-conceived properties of the dynamical
system or the interaction potentials. In particular, the explanatory work is al-
most entirely done by the dominance of the equilibrium state and the notion
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of typicality, without the need to emphasize special features of the dynamics.
The reason is simply that once we understand that the non-equilibrium re-
gion of phase-space is vanishingly small compared to the equilibrium region,
we see that there is nothing special or remarkable about dynamics for which
a typical set of solutions, starting in a non-equilibrium region, will quickly
spread over the equilibrium-region and for which equilibrium configurations
will stay in equilibrium for most of the time.
If you throw a rubber duck somewhere into the Atlantic Ocean, what do
you need to know about oceanic currents in order to explain and predict and
understand that it will almost certainly spend most (if not all) of the time
outside the region where the Titanic sank?
We should also keep in mind that dynamical considerations, to a cer-
tain degree, already figure into the partitioning of a system’s phase-space
into macro-regions and the determination of the volume (respectively the
entropy) corresponding to each one of them. In particular, the equilibrium
state, while always being the state of maximal entropy, can look very differ-
ent depending on the broad characteristics of the microscopic interactions.
Think, for instance, of the equilibrium state of a mixture of oil and wa-
ter, which, as we all know, is very different from the homogeneous solution
into which a hydrophilic compound will evolve. Or think of a gravitating
system, whose thermodynamic evolution is one of clumping and collapsing,
very much opposed to that of a (high temperature) gas on which our dis-
cussion has focused.33 But once the stage for the typicality account is thus
set, there is just no mystery as to why a system in non-equilibrium should
undergo a thermodynamic evolution. Indeed, the dynamics would have to
be utterly special to avoid carrying (all but “a few”) non-equilibrium configu-
rations into larger and larger macro-regions. It is precisely this generality of
Boltzmann’s argument that makes it so powerful, giving us an understanding
of thermodynamic behavior as a virtually universal feature of macroscopic
systems.
All that said, we share neither Frigg’s and Werndl’s interest in character-
izing general phase-flows with respect to their thermodynamic behavior, nor
their expectation that it should be possible to state necessary and sufficient
criteria for convergence to equilibrium in terms of simple mathematical prop-
33The reason being that, for an attractive potential, particles moving closer together
pick up kinetic energy, so that, roughly speaking, a macro-configuration that is spatially
more concentrated corresponds, at constant energy, to a much larger phase-space volume
in the momentum-variables.
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erties characterizing the dynamics of roughly 1024 interacting particles.34
In particular, we fail to see anything of physical or philosophical inter-
est in examples such as that of a system of uncoupled harmonic oscillators
not exhibiting thermodynamic behavior.35 In fact, the claim is not entirely
accurate. If one considers a system of oscillators with various but similar
frequencies, there is an interesting sense in which it can converge to equilib-
rium, namely from a state in which the oscillators are more or less in phase
into a state in which they aren’t.36 Presumably, what the authors mean to
say is that if we considered uncoupled harmonic oscillators as a model for
the gas, the argument for its thermodynamic behavior wouldn’t go through.
And presumably, the authors are not actually preoccupied with the ques-
tion why it is that a collection of wiggling particles will not spread over a
given volume, but mean to demonstrate that the typicality account must
be incomplete or inconclusive because its conclusion does not follow from
its premises. But to argue like this is to misunderstand the nature of the
explanation in the first place, which has never been about stating a set of
mathematical assumptions from which to prove thermodynamic behavior in
the abstract. The only thing that the example actually demonstrates, is that
a system of uncoupled harmonic oscillators is not a good model for a gas –
which is hardly a surprising discovery.
Now if any of this is a reason to mystify a physical explanation, why stop
at thermodynamics. Why not be equally puzzled about the phenomenon of
sound (let’s say), unless we see rigorous mathematical proof of the propa-
gation of sound-waves in a Van-der-Waals gas or provide a precise charac-
terization of all the Hamiltonians leading to such a behavior? Boltzmann’s
probabilistic explanation of the second law of thermodynamics is not any
more question-begging, it is just more subtle in that it rests, fundamentally,
on a typicality reasoning, rather than a mechanistic picture of how micro-
scopic dynamics produce a certain microscopic effect.
Indisputably, concerning the microscopic derivation of the second law of
34In section 7 we will explain why the commonplace answer, which is the appeal to
ergodic properties that also Frigg and Werndl advocate, doesn’t get us anywhere.
35Which, by the way, is neither much better nor much worse than other “counterex-
amples” we’ve heard on similar occasions, e.g. that a system will not convergence to
equilibrium if the Hamiltonian is identically 0, i.e. if the particles don’t move at all!
Hence, the reason why we are spending so much breath replying to a short parenthesis
is that we’ve found it to be actually quite representative of a common line of argument
employed by philosophers of science.
36See also the analysis of a system of anharmonic oscillators in (Bricmont 2001).
42
thermodynamics, very little is on firm mathematical ground; This is just a
fact about the current status of science. It is a fact that one might be un-
happy about and it is certainly a fact that will continue to motivate further
research. However, it is of utmost importance to understand that, contrary
to what some commentators have suggested, the difference between the ex-
planatory scheme that we have presented and a more rigorous proof of the
second law is not some secret ingredient like a dynamical assumption that
proponents of the typicality account have missed to specify, but a heap of
very hard, very technical work in mathematical physics. Good physics and
good philosophy of physics, on the other hand, is also about appreciating
where our understanding of an issue depends on rigorous formalization and
technical proof and where it doesn’t.
7 Against (epsilon-)ergodicity
The intellectual attractiveness of a mathematical arguments, as
well as the considerable mental labor involved in following it,
makes mathematics a powerful tool of intellectual prestidigitation
– a glittering deception in which some are entrapped, and some,
alas, entrappers. Thus, for instance, the delicious ingenuity of
the Birkhoff ergodic theorem has created the general impression
that it must play a central role in the foundations of statistical
mechanics. [...] The Birkhoff theorem in fact does us the service
of establishing its own inability to be more than a questionably
relevant superstructure upon [the] hypothesis [of absolute conti-
nuity]. (Schwartz 1992)
One of the most tenacious misunderstandings concerning the foundations
of statistical mechanics is the crucial role that many authors have ascribed
to Boltzmann’s ergodic hypothesis, respectively to the concepts of modern
ergodic theory.37 Ergodicity, or stronger properties higher up the ergodic
hierarchy (see (Berkovitz et.al. 2011)), have thereby been assigned various
tasks: to justify the choice of the microcanonical measure as the unique
stationary and absolutely continuous measure on the energy-hypersurface,
37While the original ergodic hypothesis didn’t even appear anymore in Boltzmann’s
second “lectures on gas theory”, it was later revived, in more modern form, by the ground-
breaking work of Birkhoff, von Neumann and Khinchin that established ergodic theory as
a remarkably productive (and indeed quite beautiful) field of mathematics, whose physical
relevance, however, was – and probably still is – hopelessly exaggerated.
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to explain the relevance of Gibbsian ensemble averages by identifying them
with time-averages of a single system, or, most to the point of this paper, to
explain the convergence from non-equilibrium into equilibrium.
To our knowledge, one of the first philosophical papers to question the ex-
planatory merits of ergodicity was Lawrence Sklar’s 1973 publication (Sklar
1973). Sklar entered a much-needed caveat in a time when ergodic theory
was one of the hottest topics in mathematical physics. His critique, however,
was quite subtle and we would say inappropriately subtle, since the way in
which ergodic properties ultimately fail to connect to the relevant physi-
cal circumstances and fulfill the explanatory role that had been bestowed
on them is actually rather striking, as has been pointed out more clearly
in (Schwartz 1992), (Goldstein 2001) or (Bricmont 1995).
Nevertheless, the question that went on to preoccupy people most was
whether or not any of the usual gas-models studied by physicists actually
is an ergodic system, and serious doubts were articulated, for instance, by
(Earman and Rédei 1996) (mirroring a similar discussion in the mathematical
literature, see for instance (Smale 2000)) that seem to have had some impact.
The problem with the question as such is that it inevitably and prematurely
reaffirmed its own relevance. Furthermore, the subject remains to some
degree a matter of faith, as it is extremely difficult to prove ergodic properties
for any realistically complex system.38 Anyway, it is in the light of this debate
that (Vranas 1998) and later (Frigg and Werndl 2012, 2013) proposed the
weaker (although more artificial) notion of epsilon-ergodicity to capture the
way in which systems that fail to be ergodic may turn out to be “almost
ergodic”.
The remarks that we want to add to this discussion are primarily a com-
ment on their most recent publication (Frigg and Werndl 2013), reasserting
the idea of a crucial role of ergodic properties for the explanation of thermo-
dynamic behavior in a self-proclaimed attempt to “demystify” the typicality
account. Before we lose ourselves in more general remarks, let’s recapitulate
what the issue is actually about.
Ergodicity is usually defined in terms of a rather abstract property of
dynamical systems (a dynamical system is called ergodic if the invariant sets
have measure one or zero), which, however, implies particularly nice behavior
for typical solutions. We can call a solution (i.e. a flow-line) of the dynamical
system ergodic if the proportion of time it spends in any possible region of
38Although it seems to be correct, in general, that sufficiently chaotic systems have good
ergodic properties. (Eckmann and Ruelle 1985).
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phase-space over its entire history (i.e. in the limit T →∞) corresponds to
the proportion of phase-space volume occupied by that region. Formally:
lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
1A(X(t))dt = |A|/|Ω|, (3)
where 1A(x) is the characteristic function of the set A ⊆ Ω. This is roughly
equivalent (although a bit stronger than) the statement that the solution-
trajectory covers the phase-space densely, i.e. that it comes arbitrarily close
to every single point in phase-space, thus establishing the connection with
the original (quasi-)ergodic hypothesis of Boltzmann.39
The relation between “ergodic systems” and “ergodic trajectories” is the
following: A dynamical system is ergodic if and only if almost all microstates,
that is, all microstates except for a set of measure zero, evolve on an ergodic
trajectory. Epsilon-ergodicity simply relaxes this condition to “all microstates
except for a set of measure ≤  ” (the relevant measure in both cases is the
normalized microcanonical measure on the energy-hypersurface). As men-
tioned before, it is extremely difficult to assert that any realistic system
is actually ergodic. On the other hand, every dynamical system is epsilon-
ergodic for a sufficiently large value of , and we understand Frigg andWerndl
as saying that there is numerical evidence indicating that typical Hamiltoni-
ans in a relevant class of gas-models are epsilon-ergodic for reasonably small
values of  that wouldn’t make the property entirely trivial (the two are gen-
erally silent about the order of magnitude of , but we assume in their favor
that this is what they mean).
Now how is this supposed to figure in an explanation of thermodynamic
behavior? Frigg and Werndl argue that if we assume that a system is epsilon-
ergodic (for some reasonably small value of ), we can conclude that typical
solutions, in the sense of “all solutions except for a set of initial conditions
of measure ≤ ”, are ergodic. Then, according to the two authors, the story
continues as follows:
Consider an initial condition x that lies on an ergodic solution.
The dynamics will carry x to [the equilibrium region] ΓMeq and
will keep it there most of the time. The system will move out of
the equilibrium region every now and then and visit non-equilibrium
states. Yet since these are small compared to ΓMeq , it will only
39See for instance (Ehrenfests 1911) on Boltzmann’s ergodic hypothesis, or (Sklar 1973,
pp. 77) for a more recent discussion.
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spend a small fraction of time there. Hence the entropy is close
to its maximum most of the time and fluctuates away from it
only occasionally. Therefore, ergodic solutions behave TD-like
[thermodynamic-like].40 (Frigg and Werndl 2013)
One thing that this argument might accomplish is to demonstrate a bit of
the appeal of ergodic theory. Whereas (as we saw) it’s extremely difficult
to prove anything in a rigorous manner just by following the rationale of
the combinatorial argument, Frigg and Werndl seem to base their conclusion
on a rigorous mathematical statement in form of eq. (7). Unfortunately,
though, even the most elegant mathematical expression comes short of being
explanatory if it fails to connect to physics. As we will see, the problem with
Frigg and Werndl’s conclusion, in particular with their claim that an ergodic
evolution will carry a non-equilibrium state into equilibrium, is that in the
sense in which the statement is correct, it is irrelevant, whereas in the sense
in which it pretends to be relevant, it’s a non-sequitur.
There are various reasons why ergodicity cannot be essential to the expla-
nation of the second law of thermodynamics, the most important being the
stark discrepancy between the characteristic time-scales of thermodynamic
behavior on the one hand and ergodic behavior on the other. The relevant
time-scales for ergodic behavior, the time-scales, that is, on which it starts
to matter that trajectories “wind around” the energy hypersurface, are those
of the Poincaré cycles i.e. in the order of 101020 years!41 To argue about a
system with a macroscopic number of degrees of freedom by means of the
ergodic limit is thus to argue about an average over a period of time that is
far beyond imagination and even further beyond physical relevance.
It seems to us that the kind of account that Frigg and Werndl promote
is motivated, at least in part, by the desire to specify a condition for ther-
modynamic behavior that can apply to particular solutions, i.e. to state an
assumption about the dynamical evolution of an individual system which
implies – and thus supposedly explains – its “thermodynamic-like” behav-
ior. However, it can be readily understood that whether or not the macro-
40Frigg and Werndl, alongside other authors, insist on the term “thermodynamic-like
behavior” instead of “thermodynamic behavior”, to draw the contrast between the Boltz-
mann entropy that fluctuates, and the Clausius’ formulation of the second law, according
to which the entropy of a closed system is never decreasing (Frigg and Werndl 2013, p.
3). We did not adopt this terminology, nor do we find it particularly helpful.
41Cf. the discussion in section 3.5. This point was, in fact, already made by the
Ehrenfests (Ehrenfests 1911, p. 61) about a century ago.
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evolution of a system shows the kind of thermodynamic behavior that we
want to explain has really nothing to do with whether or not its micro-
evolution follows an ergodic solution.
Ergodicity is certainly not necessary for thermodynamic behavior since
virtually any generic trajectory through phase-space would spend most of
the time in the equilibrium-region; To do so, it need not cover phase-space
densely anymore than a person’s travel routes need to cover the surface of
the earth densely to account for him spending most of the time outside the
vatican.
And ergodicity is certainly not sufficient for thermodynamic behavior,
since it is a time-symmetric property, that is, the time-reversal of an er-
godic solution is also an ergodic solution. But this means, of course, that a
derivation of an irreversible macro-behavior cannot possibly be a matter of
asserting an ergodic evolution of the microstate.
To put it differently, viz. in the jargon of the previous sections, if
the “good” (thermodynamic) solutions are ergodic, then the “bad” (anti-
thermodynamic) solutions are ergodic as well. Ergodicity, of course, implies
that on the long run – which might be a very very very long run, expressed
by the limit T → ∞ – all of these solutions will eventually return to equi-
librium and spend overall most of its history, from now to eternity, in that
state; however, as emphasized before, this assertion doesn’t tell us anything
about the evolution of a system on time-scales relevant for explaining the
thermodynamic behavior that we observe in nature.
Indeed, if we considered a system in a low entropy state and had good
reasons to believe that it’s described by an ergodic solution of some Hamil-
tonian dynamics, it could be an ergodic solution that will rapidly converge
to equilibrium, but it could also be an ergodic solution for which the entropy
will further decrease – or remain constant – over the next few seconds, or
hours, or years, or billions of years...42 Of course, it would seem that if our
aim was to predict that a gas will either expand or contract or stay roughly
the same, we could have turned to classical logic rather than dynamical sys-
tem theory. The crucial and subtle point is still to argue that one alternative
is much more likely than the other, or better, that one alternative is in fact
42The authors briefly acknowledge the issue of “relaxation times” in (Frigg and Werndl
2013), where they go on to argue by citing numerical results about gas-systems that could
be ergodic and seem to converge to equilibrium with very short relaxation times, as if that
was somehow empirical evidence in their favor. However, no one disputes that ergodic
systems will typically converge to equilibrium with relatively short relaxation times. What
is disputed is the claim that their ergodicity is essential to this fact.
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typical with respect to the system’s initial macrostate. This argument was
given by Boltzmann and discussed in detail in the first sections of this paper.
Ergodicity, we recall, had no part in it.
In addition to the inadequacy of ergodicity for explaining thermody-
namic behavior in general, there is a further issue with the notion of epsilon-
ergodicity promoted by Frigg and Werndl that makes it a particularly useless
concept. That is, even if we established this property for a particular sys-
tem and some very small value of , it is very well possible that the order of
magnitude of  is comparable to, or even much larger than, the proportion of
phase-space (respectively of the energy hypersurface) occupied by a generic
low-entropy macrostate (which, after all, may be of the order of 10−1020 or
even much smaller). In this case, epsilon-ergodictiy de facto establishes er-
godic behavior only for typical systems among those whose initial state is
already in equilibrium, but doesn’t allow us to conclude anything about the
more relevant case of systems starting out in non-equilibrium macrostates,
since these are potentially among the exception-sets of measure ≤ .43
8 Conclusion
Joel Lebowitz begins his beautiful discussion of Boltzmann’s statistical me-
chanics by noting:
Boltzmann’s very original ideas were, perhaps not surprisingly,
difficult to grasp for some of his contemporaries. What is surpris-
ing is that some of the confusion created by these misunderstand-
ings, the so-called “controversies” with Zermelo and others still
persist at present. There is really no excuse for this considering
the clarity of Boltzmann’s responses and later writings. (Lebowitz
1993, p. 2)
One could add to this last sentence the clarity of Lebowitz’ own writings,
alongside those of Roger Penrose, Shelly Goldstein, Jean Bricmont, and oth-
ers. With the present paper, we’ve made our own effort to eliminate excuses
for confusion about Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics and his explanation
of the “second law”.
It is often said, and rightly so, that in science, controversy drives progress.
Certainly, when it comes to the foundations or the philosophy of physics, this
43See our discussion in section 3.1. and 3.2 for why Frigg’s and Werndl’s account fails
in this respect and Boltzmann’s doesn’t.
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is as true as ever. And yet, every once in a while, someone just happens to
get things right – in which case one can get farther by standing on a giants’
shoulder than by desperately trying to tear him down. And for all that can
be said – and that we did say – to translate Boltzmann’s insights into a
more modern language, and for all that can be done – and still needs to
be done – to supplement his arguments with rigorous mathematical results:
Boltzmann just got it right. And his critics got it wrong.
Of course, distinctions have to be made here. The first person who raised
the recurrence objection made a very relevant and instructive point. The
hundredth’s person to raise the same objection more than a century later,
still insisting that it reveals a fundamental inconsistency in Boltzmann’s
arguments, is no longer advancing the issue. On the other hand, some of the
objections raised by modern philosophers of science, dwelling on the trivial
observation that the typicality account is not a rigorous mathematical proof,
were rather unrewarding even the first time.
This is not to say that there are no open issues – quite the contrary.
Standing on solid foundations, the substantial questions and the most promis-
ing paths to move forward become only more clear. In our paper, we have
identified several such questions and shown how they can be understood
and approached on the basis of Boltzmannian statistical mechanics. From
a physical perspective, the deepest question, arguably, concerns the Past
Hypothesis, i.e. the origin of irreversibility and the thermodynamic arrow
of time in our universe, that appears to lie in a very special macrostate of
the early universe. In mathematics, epochal problems like the validity and
the solution theory of the Boltzmann equation are only the most promi-
nent examples illustrating the need to develop new techniques to handle the
complexity of many-particle physics and the micro-to-macro transition.44
Finally, we think that the philosophical debate would greatly benefit from
appreciating and further elaborating typicality as a form of non-deductive
reasoning and maybe even as a fundamental philosophical category. In this
paper, we have tried to demonstrate the great relevance of the concept of typ-
icality for understanding probabilities in physics, describing macro-to-micro
reduction and grounding the nomological status of macroscopic laws. And
yet, there seems to be disappointingly little precedence in the philosophical
literature, so that much remains to be said, more insights to gain and more
benefits to reap. However not here.
44See (Villani 2002) for a survey of recent developments.
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